By Igor It is only when a war is over, that we start wondering about what brought it on. We need a deep analysis of its causes and correct conclusions for the future. So what after all has happened in Kosovo?
A tight knot of political, social, economic, and ethnic problems in the Balkans going deep in history have detonated multiple crises in Europe. The collapse of Yugoslavia have only made these problems worse. One of these problems is the problem of Kosovo. Unfortunately in spite of international community appeals and Russian efforts, Belgrade did not realize the gravity of the situation in due time. Relevant political measures aimed at the stabilization by providing Kosovo with wider autonomy, which undoubtedly would have allowed to ease tensions, were not taken.
Yugoslav leaders who could not come up a feasible political solution for Kosovo provided NATO with a good excuse to test in practice the new concept of "unlimited responsibility" of the alliance and its right to "humanitarian intervention." Stakes were made on the blitzkrieg to celebrate NATO"s "success" and the alliance"s new role in international affairs at the anniversary summit in Washington.
No doubt that preparing the intervention against Yugoslavia NATO, and primarily the United States, solved their own problems. Their motives were clear. Kosovan refugees were by far not the most important factor. Ideological and personal approach of the leading NATO nations to Belgrade also played a certain role.
Exactly this and not the considerations of a higher humanity influenced the NATO decision to start, ignoring the UN Charter and accepted principles of the international law, systematical bombing of the Yugoslav territory. That is why even the formal justification to the air raids was different--now trying to convince Milosevic to sign Rambouillet agreements, now trying to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe (which did not exist before the military invasion), now guaranteeing the return of refugees, etc.
One way or another, in the eyes of international law, this was an open NATO aggression against a sovereign. The definition of aggression adopted by the consensus of the UN General Assembly in December 1974 (resolution 3314) reads as follows: "Bombing by the armed forces of a state the territory of another state or use of any arms by a state against the territory of another state shall be defined as an act of aggression┘ Considerations of any nature: political, economic, military, or any other cannot serve as the justification of an aggression."
Russia has condemned the NATO action against Yugoslavia from the very beginning and worked to put an end to the air campaign. It is only too unfortunate that as NATO bombers pounded Yugoslavia, Belgrade used unacceptable methods to solve the ethnic problem in Kosovo.
In other words, Kosovars found themselves between a rock and a hard place. We know the result--thousands of refugees, destroyed infrastructure and social environment. That is why Russia trying to bring the Kosovo problem in the negotiations format proceeded from the necessity to immediately stop all forms of violence and repression. And now we need to heal wounds inflicted by air raid bombings and repression on the ground.
Yugoslavia had no chance to win the war; the forces were too uneven. Now the war is finished-with immense efforts and loses. And to a large extent it became possible due to the role played by Russia. Moreover aiming at ending the NATO adventure we did not allow any direct Russian involvement in the armed conflict and sliding into the confrontation with the United States and NATO. Remaining open channels for contacts-both bilateral and through the G-8-allowed us to restart the negotiating process.
An objective analysis of the conflict shows that in the Balkans, as in the Persian Gulf, an attempt was made to carry out a plan drafted in the spirit of the "new NATO strategy"-to resolve disputes with armed force.
This is an attempt to make the world structure unipolar in which the United States takes the leading role. The danger of such pretensions is evident. The fact that at this stage NATO had to compromise does not mean that it had given up its long-term goals.
Russia faces a difficult task of promoting the idea of multipolar world structure based on the strict observance of the UN Charter and supremacy of the international law. The way to achieve it passes through further strengthening of the UN, of the legal base of the international relations system, and dynamic development of interactions with many states.
In the Balkans Russia is to use comprehensive approach considering all the agreed conditions of the settlement-political, economic, and military. We are to define the optimal guidelines of our participation in all the appropriate events including international civil presence and the presence on security in Kosovo. We should make Russia"s interests-both internal and international - our priority. Decisions we make must correspond to the important role played by our country in achieving peace but they should be coordinated with our real material capabilities.
On the regional level we should contribute to the development of trust and cooperation in the Balkans, which will be supported by the Stability Pact for the South Eastern Europe in which we should actively participate.
There are a few main goals in the peace deal itself. First of all, Yugoslavia"s sovereignty and territorial integrity has been guaranteed, ensuring security for peaceful coexistence of all the ethnic groups in the region.
But rebuilding Yugoslavia will be a difficult task. Unfortunately stability and prosperity will not coming to the Balkans any time soon. We are at the beginning of a long and difficult road. What is important is that it is a peaceful road-and much of the credit for that should go to Russia.
